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The United States Uranium Registry (USUR) was formed in 1978 to investi-
gate potential hazards from occupational exposure to uranium and to assess 
the need for special health-related studies of uranium workers. The need for 
information on the behavior and effects of uranium in man was emphasized at 
the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration's conference on occupa-
tional health experience with uranium in 1975. In response to this need, the 
U.S. Department of Energy provided funding to the Hanford Environmental Health 
Foundation to establish the USUR. Pacific Northwest Laboratory was identified 
to provide technical support in the area of health physics. 
The major goals of the Registry are: 
• to characterize the processes and the occupational health aspects of 
the uranium fuel cycle 
• to determine the concentration and distribution of uranium and its 
decay daughters in the tissues of exposed workers 
• to identify populations suitable for special health-related studies. 
Personnel working for the USUR have visited 35 uranium facilities to 
collect information toward accomplishment of these goals. Facilities visited 
include currently operating commercial uranium facilities (mines, mills, con-
version plants, enrichment plants, and fuel fabrication plants), and several 
noncommercial and inactive uranium facilities. Information obtained to date 
covers general facility descriptions, process descriptions, radiological 
exposures, regulatory requirements, radiological health practices, nonradio-
logical exposures, and occupational medicine programs. The information-
gathering phase of the program reinforced the original sense that a post-mortem 
tissue program for uranium workers is needed. The current lack of information 
on the deposition, distribution, and retention of various uranium compounds in 
man greatly increases the difficulty of developing appropriate standards for 
uranium exposure and, consequently, worker protection policies. The tissue 
program will in due course provide that information. 
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Following is a brief summary of the data collected during the inforrnation-
gathering phase, and the current status of the tissue program. 
RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURES 
Inhalation is the most important pathway for occupational exposure in the 
commercial uranium industry. External radiation exposures are not considered 
to be as significant. Workers in the industry may inhale many different 
uranium compounds. 
• Mines - The major hazard in underground uranium mines is inhalation 
of radon daughter products. Past studies have shown increased 
incidence of lung cancer among miners due to radon daughters. 
Inhalation of radon daughters at open-pit mines is generally 
negligible because of the diluting effect of the atmosphere. 
• Mills - At conventional uranium mills, the primary concerns are 
inhalation of ore dust in ore crushing areas and inhalation of 
yellowcake dust in the drying and packaging areas. Both production 
and maintenance personnel who work in these areas have a potential 
for exposure. 
• Conversion facilities - At conversion facilities, inhalation of the 
following uranium compounds is possible: yellowcake, uranium 
tetrafluoride (UF4), uranium dioxide (U02), uranium trioxide 
(U03), and uranyl fluoride (U02F2) which is formed when UF6 
reacts with the atmosphere. Activities with the greatest potential 
for inhalation exposures include yellowcake sampling, waste removal, 
and maintenance. 
• Enrichment facilities - The greatest potential for inhalation 
exposures in enrichment facilities is from inadvertent uranium 
hexafluoride (UF6 ) releases during sampling, UF6 cylinder 
loading and unloading, and maintenance operations. 
• Fuel fabrication facilities - In the fuel fabrication industry, the 
primary inhalation hazard is exposure to U02 during packaging and 




REGULATION OF THE COMMERCIAL URANIUM INDUSTRY 
The current industry is regulated by numerous federal and state agencies. 
For example, the Mine Safety and Health Administration and state agencies 
regulate uranium mines whereas the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or agreement 
• state agencies regulate uranium mills. This simultaneous regulation by many 
agencies has resulted in inconsistencies among radiation protection programs 
at similar types of facilities because the same regulations may be interpreted 
and enforced in different ways by independent regulatory bodies. 
• 
• 
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH PRACTICES 
Facility monitoring, exposure control, exposure evaluation, and record-
keeping are the four general methods used to identify and control radiation 
hazards in the commercial uranium industry. 
• Facility monitoring - Air in the breathing zone is monitored for 
suspended uranium nuclides, and working locations are surveyed for 
surface contamination or any accumulation of gamma-emitting 
materials. The selection of monitoring locations and the frequency 
of sampling or measurements are determined by consideration of the 
quantities of radioactive materials in the production processes, 
their potential for escape from the system into the workplace, and 
their proximity to the worker. 
• Exposure control - Exposure control is achieved through design 
engineering to prevent and control releases, respiratory protection 
programs, the use of protective clothing, and worker training 
programs. 
• Exposure evaluation - Exposure evaluation methods include bioassay 
(urinalysis and lung counting) for estimating internal depositions 
of uranium, and personal external gamma monitoring. The frequency 
of urinalysis for uranium varies among the uranium facilities. 
Routine lung counting is only performed at conversion, enrichment, 
and fuel fabrication facilities • 
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• Recordkeeping - Recordkeeping involves maintaining records of 
facility monitoring and exposure evaluation data. Regulatory 
agencies require each licensed facility to maintain such records. 
Uranium can present both a radiological and a chemical hazard to the body. 
The chemistry of a uranium compound determines its solubility in body fluids 
and its retention time in the tissues. For example, yellowcake consists of 
varying percentages of the soluble uranium compound ammonium diuranate, and 
the insoluble uranium compound U308' depending on the temperature at which 
the yellowcake is dried. Both soluble and insoluble forms of uranium may 
accumulate in different parts of the body through chronic exposure and remain 
there for long periods, resulting in a radiological hazard. Soluble forms 
also represent a chemical hazard to kidney tissue. The solubility of inhaled 
uranium compounds is only one of many factors that need to be considered to 
achieve even a crude estimate of dose from internally deposited uranium. 
NONRADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURES 
Nonradiological exposures in the uranium industry have been identified as 
a part of this study because they may affect the interpretation of the health 
effects of radiological exposures. An example is the impact of diesel emis-
sions and cigarette smoking on underground miners, which is being studied by 
other investigators. Indeed, nonradiological exposures to substances such as 
silica, which is present in the mining phase of the industry, may have more 
important and far-reaching effects on worker health than radiological expo-
sures. In other phases of the industry, ammonia is thought to present the 
greatest single potential for exposure. Exposures to a variety of other 
chemicals and gases are possible; however, concentrations are generally not at 
levels thought to be a health hazard. 
U.S. URANIUM REGISTRY TISSUE PROGRAM 
An important accomplishment of the USUR has been to establish a post-
mortem tissue program. The program represents the first systematic effort to 
contact and gain the cooperation of workers exposed to uranium. The primary 






• determine the distribution and levels of uranium in the tissues of 
occupationally exposed workers 
• compare bioassay measurements of exposed individuals with the 
results of analyses of tissue obtained at autopsy 
• seek evidence of histopathologic changes related to any uranium 
deposition that may be present. 
Procedures have been established for enrolling workers, identifying the tissues 
to be sampled, and analyzing the samples. Active enrollment of workers is now 
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OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES TO URANIUM: 
PROCESSES, HAZARDS, AND REGULATIONS 
A FIELD STUDY OF THE COMMERCIAL FUEL CYCLE 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the birth of the uranium industry during the Manhattan Project of 
World War II, the industry has experienced continued expansion, in response 
first to increased military needs, and later to a growing nuclear power indus-
try. Today, several thousand workers are employed in the many different types 
of uranium-handling and uranium-processing facilities. 
The total radiation exposure of the worker population in the uranium-
handling industry constitutes a significant portion of the occupational 
exposures throughout the nuclear industry. During the early years, industry 
conditions often led to worker exposures that would be considered excessive 
by today's standards. Since that time, much data has been collected on ura-
nium metabolism in animals; however, as the conference on occupational health 
experience with uranium (U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration 
(ERDA) 1975) pointed out, information on the behavior and effects of uranium 
in man is needed. 
In response to this need and to long-term and widespread occupational 
exposures to uranium and its related compounds, the United States Uranium 
Registry was formed. 
SCOPE OF URANIUM REGISTRY ACTIVITIES 
In 1978, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) provided funding to the 
Hanford Environmental Health Foundation (HEHF) to establish a United States 
Uranium Registry (USUR). The Hanford Environmental Health Foundation, a con-
tractor to DOE, provides occupational health, psychology, and environmental 
health science services to contractor employees at the Hanford Project in 
Richland, Washington. The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), operated for 
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DOE by Battelle Memorial Institute, was identified to provide technical sup-
port and assistance in the area of health physics. 
The Registry's purpose is to investigate potential hazards from occupa-
tional exposure to uranium and to assess the need for special health-related 
studies of uranium workers. The Registry can provide a center for the collec-
tion and evaluation of data on the uptake, translocation, and retention of 
uranium and related nuclides in occupationally exposed individuals. It could 
also function as a clearinghouse for information and data for related programs 
and research. Specific goals of the Registry are: 
• to characterize the uranium fuel cycle 
• to evaluate the adequacy of documented studies on health effects 
• to determine the concentration and distribution of uranium and its 
decay daughters in the tissues of exposed workers 
• to provide information and recommendations for improving the 
measurement, dosimetry, and control technology of uranium 
• to identify populations suitable for special health-related studies. 
PROGRESS 
To meet these goals, the Registry has thus far completed the following 
tasks: 
• visited numerous uranium facilities 
• described the uranium facilities and their associated processes 
• characterized the magnitude and nature of worker exposure to uranium 
and related materials 
• identified occupational exposures to substances other than uranium 
in the uranium industry 
• described and evaluated methods currently used to measure and 
evaluate uranium exposures 
• established a program for post-mortem tissue analysis of workers 







u.s. Uranium Registry representatives have visited 35 facilities. A 
listing of these facilities is provided in Appendix A. Specialists in three 
disciplines, health physics, industrial hygiene, and occupational medicine, 
visited each site. Through these site visits, considerable information on the 
uranium industry was gathered, including process descriptions, areas of great-
est potential radiological exposure, regulation of the industry, radiological 
health practices, and industrial hygiene hazards. This information provided 
the basis for determining which uranium worker populations are suitable for 
health-related studies. 
The information-gathering phase of the program reinforced the original 
sense that a post-mortem tissue program for uranium workers is needed. The 
current lack of information on the deposition, distribution, and retention of 
various uranium compounds in man greatly increases the difficulty of developing 
appropriate standards for uranium exposure and, consequently, worker protec-
tion policies. The tissue program will in due course provide that information. 
The data accumulated to date also provide an excellent basis for evaluating 
the potential for epidemiological studies of uranium exposure in the industry. 
A report along these lines is projected for future development when additional 
data immediately relevant to epidemiologic needs become available. 
This report provides a summary of Registry work to date. The history of 
the uranium industry is outlined first, and the current commercial uranium 
industry (mining, milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication) is 
described. This description includes information on basic processes and areas 
of greatest potential radiological exposure. In addition, inactive commercial 
facilities and other uranium operations are discussed. Regulation of the 
commercial production industry for uranium fuel is reported next, including 
the historic development of regulations and the current regulatory agencies 
and procedures for each phase of the industry. A review of radiological 
health practices in the industry--facility monitoring, exposure control, 
exposure evaluation, and record-keeping--is then presented. A discussion of 
the nonradiological hazards of the industry is provided in the next section, 
and the final section describes the tissue program developed as part of the 
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Registry. Appendix B is a general discussion of the radiological properties 
of uranium, and Appendix C is a review of the factors involved in the dosim-
etry of uranium in the body. 
Three additional reports are projected for completion during fiscal year 
1982. They will provide information of the type presented here, but in 
substantially greater detail, for the following segments of the industry: 
1) mining; 2) milling, and 3) conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. 
Those reports will more adequately reflect the volume of relevant data 





THE URANIUM INDUSTRY 
In 1939, just 150 years after K1aproth discovered the element uranium, 
nuclear fission was documented and scientists began to visualize the libera-
tion of atomic energy through a self-sustaining fission chain reaction. The 
first concepts for the uses of atomic energy were for energy production and 
national security. In June of 1940, the National Defense Research Committee 
(NDRC) was established, and in late 1940, the first major contract for govern-
ment support of atomic research was approved. By late 1941, the findings from 
the research strongly supported the use of nuclear fission in weapons of 
immense magnitude, and NDRC recommended on December 6, 1941, that the U.S. 
government support an all-out effort for an atomic energy program. At that 
time, the uranium metal produced in the United States was measured in gram or 
ounce quantities. 
In January of 1942, a program was undertaken to obtain uranium metal in 
quantity. By late 1942, three organizations (Westinghouse, Iowa State College, 
and Metal Hydrides) had reached a production level of up to 100 pounds (45 kg) 
of uranium a week. On December 2, 1942, the chain-reacting pile under the west 
stand of Stagg Field at the University of Chicago, supplied by these sources, 
reached criticality. On May 1, 1943, the uranium metal requirements for 
research and production were taken over by the Manhattan Project (Wilhelm 
1960). 
The Manhattan Project brought a steadily increasing need for uranium. 
Approximately two-thirds of it was derived from high-grade Belgian Congo ores 
and one-third from Canadian and Colorado Plateau ores. The Belgian Congo ores 
averaged about 25% uranium, as compared with the 0.11% uranium averaged in ores 
mined today. High-grade Belgian Congo ores were received, crushed, and assayed 
at a U.S. government warehouse in Middlesex, New Jersey. The lower-grade ores 
from the Colorado Plateau area were obtained from tailings of a vanadium 
extraction process. The tailings were processed by the Vanadium Corporation 
of America in Naturita, Colorado, and the U.S. Vanadium Corporation in Uravan 
and Durango, Colorado. 
5 
The 11 facilities involved in producing nuclear-grade uranium for the 
Manhattan Project were widely dispersed throughout the United States. The 
three end products produced at these facilities were uranium metal for the 
plutonium production reactors at the Hanford Reservation in Washington State, 
uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for isotopic enrichment at the Oak Ridge Gaseous 
Diffusion Plant in Tennessee, and uranium tetrachloride (UC1 4) for feed for 
the calutron magnetic isotopic separators at Oak Ridge (ERDA 1975). 
Throughout the 1950s, the demand for uranium for nuclear weapons use led 
to extensive exploration of uranium-bearing ore deposits. Major deposits were 
located in the Colorado Plateau area (which includes parts of western Colorado, 
eastern Utah, northeastern Arizona, and northwestern New Mexico) and the Wyom-
ing Basins (Clark 1974; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 1979; Merritt 
1971). These areas are still the major uranium-ore-producing areas in the 
United States (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 1980). 
Uranium production decreased in the mid-1960s as the demand for uranium 
shifted from a military market to a small commercial market. Nuclear power 
was feasible in the 1960s, but it was not economically competitive with other 
energy sources (Clark 1974). As a result, the number of active uranium mills 
and the production rates of those mills decreased considerably. Many uranium 
exploration activities were also abandoned in the mid-1960s. In the late 
1960s, as uranium-fueled reactors for the production of electric power became 
economically competitive with other power sources, uranium production again 
increased. Today's uranium production levels are similar to the peak pro-
duction levels of the early 1960s (DOE 1980). With nuclear power plants 
currently supplying about 9% of the U.S. electricity, and predictions that 
they will provide between 9% and 20% by the year 2000, uranium needs should 
continue at or above the 1978 levels (NRC 1980). 
CURRENT COMMERCIAL URANIUM INDUSTRY 
The commercial uranium industry involves mining uranium ore and convert-
ing the uranium concentrate into fuel for nuclear reactors. This segment of 






stages: mining, milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. These 
stages are shown pictorially in Figure 1, and the following subsections pre-
sent for each stage a brief description of the process and the steps most 
likely t o involve radiological exposures to uranium . 
Mining 
Min i ng is the removal of uranium ore from the ground, primarily by open-
pit and underground methods. In 1979, approximately 15 million tons (13.6 
million metric tons (t)) of ore with an average U30S content of 0.11% were 
mined from open-pit and underground mines and shipped to mills and buying 
stations . In the peak production years of 1960 and 1961, average ore grades 
were much higher rv O.25% U30S) . Therefore, although only about half the 
1979 tonnage was mined in those years, greater quantities of U30S were 
URA NIUM MINE 
MILLING URANIUM YELLOWCAKE CONVERSION 
(U30S) ~ 
-[3 I = l~fLJ 
'-------- --' 
URANIUM ORE ... 
UF6 I 
6? 
FUEL FABRICATION ENRICHED . ENRICHMENT , 
JU11 11 1111 ~~UM_r r r r r rllJ :(JI 
I 
FRESH FU;j" 
TAILS ~ , 
DEPLETED URANI UM 
MANUFACTURI NG 
FIGURE 1. Front End of t he Uranium Fuel Cycle (ERDA 1975) 
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present (DOE 1980). The decrease in the U308 content of ore over the years 
has resulted in a need for· greater quantities of mined ore to meet demands. 
In the early years, most uranium ore was mined by underground methods. 
It was not until 1953 that open-pit mining started contributing significantly 
(~25%) to the total ore production. Production from open-pit mines continued 
to increase steadily until 1971, when it surpassed underground ore production. 
This trend is continuing (DOE 1980). 
Table 1 presents a comparison of 1979 data for open-pit and underground 
mines. About five times as many underground mines as open-pit mines operated 
during 1979; however, the total production capacity of open-pit mines was 
approximately twice that of underground mines. Underground mining is more 
labor intensive than open-pit mining: it takes approximately two and a half 
times as many workers to mine a ton of ore by underground methods as by open-
pit methods. 
Other mining methods include solution mining, the recovery of uranium 
from phosphoric acid (referred to in this document as uranium recovery), and 
heap leaching. In 1979, 25% of the 20,700 tons (18,770 t) of U308 was pro-
duced by these methods (DOE 1980). 
Figure 2 shows the locations of the uranium resource regions of the 
United States. The Colorado Plateau and the Wyoming Basins have been and 
TABLE 1. 1979 Mining Data(a) 
Number of Tons of Tons of U308 
Mines Ore Mined in Mined Ore(b) Miners 
Open-Pit Mines 62 9.7 x 106 9400 2311 
Underground Mines 300 5.4 x 106 6300 3064 
(a) Source: DOE 1980. 
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FIGURE 2. Uranium Resource Regions of the United St ates (derived from 
DOE 1980) 
continue to be the major uranium-ore-producing areas. During 1979, 49% of the 
U308 produced from ore came from the Colorado Plateau and 28% from the Wyoming 
Basins (DOE 1980). 
The processes described below are for open-pit and underground mining. 
Solution mining, uranium recovery operations, and heap-leaching processes are 
more closely related to uranium milling and will be described in a later 
section. 
Process Description 
The decision to mine by open-pit or underground methods is dependent on 
mining costs. These costs are influenced by such factors as the size, shape, 
grade, depth, and thickness of ore deposits. 
Open-pit mining ;s used when ore deposits are near the surface and the 
overburden can be easily removed. It is feasible to depths of more than 500 ft 
(152 m), but underground mining is usually the method of choice below 300 ft 
(91 m). The first step in the process is to remove topsoil using tractor 
scrapers and to stockpile it for the later reclamation of the excavated areas. 
Next, overburden, which consists primarily of unconsolidated sandstone and 
mudstone, is removed using diesel-power shovels. The overburden is stockpiled 
for use as backfill for excavated pits. Ore pockets are then identified with 
Geiger counters, and scrapers remove waste in the immediate area of the ore. 
The exposed ore is blasted or loosened with rippers and loaded into dump 
trucks. The ore in each truck is assayed for uranium content by gamma-ray 
analysis at a probe tower and taken to nearby blending piles. Finally, front-
end loaders load the blended ore into ore-hauling trucks for transport to the 
milling location. 
Underground mining is preferred when the uranium ore lies at depths where 
the removal of overburden would be too costly. The size of ore bodies mined 
by underground methods is variable. The largest ore bodies may be as much as 
0.5 mile (0.8 km) long, several hundred feet (up to 100 m) wide, and from 5 to 
100 ft (1.5 to 30 m) thick. The first step in the underground mining process 
is the construction of a vertical shaft(s) about 15 ft (4.6 m) in diameter to 




via the shaft and the mined ore is removed through it. Once the shaft is 
completed, two types of horizontal drifts are constructed outward from it 
beneath the ore zone: haulage drifts, which parallel the length of the ore 
body, and crosscut drifts, which run perpendicular to the haulage drifts to 
reach the extremities of the ore body. Ventilation holes (typically 3 to 6 ft 
or 0.9 to 1.8 m in diameter) are bored at various locations from the surface 
down to the drifts. Ore bodies are entered from beneath, through vertical or 
inclined openings (raises) driven up from the drifts, to utilize gravity for 
ore hand 1 i ng and for drainage of ground water from the ore body. 
Once drifts and raises are complete, extraction or stoping of an ore body 
begins by one of several stoping methods, including open, room and pillar, and 
square set. The type of stoping method used depends on the stability of the 
earth and the size and shape of the ore deposit. Ore is loosened by drilling 
or blasting and then is moved to the raises by mechanical slushers. At the 
bottom of raises, the ore is pulled out of chutes into trains of ore cars. 
The trains move the ore to a shaft pocket where it is dumped into a slusher 
trench. From there, the ore is moved with a large slusher hoist and bucket to 
a loading pocket where it is measured to fill one ore skip with a typical 
capacity of 4 to 6 tons (3.6 to 5.4 t). Skips are then hoisted to the surface 
for distribution to stockpiles or to a mill. 
Radiological Exposures 
In open-pit uranium-ore mines, radiological exposures to workers are 
minimal. Airborne radioactivity is negligible because of the diluting effect 
of the atmosphere. The levels of external radiation to which open-pit workers 
are exposed are higher than background levels, particularly near ore deposits 
and ore-hauling trucks. One company reports an average annual external dose 
of 45 mrem for their open-pit workers (Miller and Scott 1980). 
In underground mines, the primary radiological hazard is exposure to 
airborne radionuclides, especially the inhalation of airborne radon and short-
lived radon daughters. Radon-222 is an inert noble gas that passes freely 
into and out of workers' lungs with minimal deposition in the respiratory 
system. Short-lived radon daughters (218po , 214pb , 214Bi , 214po) can 
11 
enter the respiratory tract as single, unattached atoms or attached to dust 
particles. The single atoms (the unattached fraction) of radon daughters are 
considered more hazardous than those that are attached because they deposit 
preferentially in the upper passages of the respiratory tract. Alpha decay of 
inhaled radon daughters results in a radiation dose to the respiratory system 
about 20 times greater than that from the decay of radon (IAEA 1976). Because 
radon (a daughter of 226Ra ) continuously emanates from the ore, ventilation 
air is needed to prevent the buildup of high concentrations of radon daughters. 
Significant increases in lung cancer noted among underground uranium miners 
have been shown to be the result of excessive exposure of the tracheobronchial 
epithelium to radon daughters (National Research Council 1980). 
The inhalation of long-lived alpha emitters (235U, 234U, 230Th , 226Ra , 
210po ) is less of a concern than the inhalation of radon and its daughters. 
Underground mining activities such as drilling and blasting can produce 
increased ore dust levels; however, the concentrations of long-lived radio-
nuclides in ore dust are usually maintained at levels below the maximum per-
missible limits as a result of forced ventilation. 
Underground uranium miners are also exposed to external beta and gamma 
radiation emitted by ore bodies at levels that are highly dependent on the 
grade of the ore. One company reports an average annual external dose of 
332 mrem for their underground miners (Miller and Scott 1980). Where high ore 
grades are mined, external exposures can approach the 5-rem/yr whole-body 
limit. 
Milling 
Uranium milling is a physical and chemical process that extracts the 
uranium from ore. The product is a semirefined uranium compound called 
yellowcake, which encompasses a variety of uranium compounds with different 
colors, chemical compositions, and solubilities in lung fluids. Yellowcake 
contains between 80% and 97% uranium, usually in the form of uranium oxide 
(U308). The terms yellowcake and U308 are used interchangeably throughout the 
industry. 
Uranium milling processes in the United States can be divided into two 




operating conventional mills accounted for approximately 90% of the U308 pro-
duced in 1979 (DOE 1980). The conventional mills are characteristically 
located near the mines in arid, isolated regions of the American West, as 
shown in Figure 3. Of the approximately 18,730 tons (16,990 t) of U308 
produced in 1979, about 40% and 29% came from the states of New Mexico and 
Wyoming, respectively (DOE 1980). 
Conventional mills are rated according to their ore-processing capacity 
(tons of ore processed per day or TPD). The largest conventional mill has a 
rated capacity of 7000 TPD, the smallest 450 TPD. The number of workers 
(operators and maintenance personnel) is generally less than 50 for a small-
capacity mill «1000 TPD or <900 t/day), 50 to 100 for an intermediate-
capacity mill (1000 to 3000 TPD or 900 to 2700 t/day) and 100 to 250 for a 
1 ar ge-capac i ty mi 11 (3000 to 7000 TPD or 2700 to 6300 t/ day) • 
The three major unconventional milling processes used in the United States 
are solution (in-situ) mining, uranium recovery operations, and heap leaching. 
These processes accounted for approximately 10% of the total yellowcake pro-
duction in 1979. Solution mining produced approximately 6% of the total, 
uranium recovery approximately 3%, and heap leaching approximately 1%. In 
addition, uranium can be recovered as a by-product of copper and beryllium 
milling. These processes contributed less than 1% of the total yellowcake 
production in 1979 (DOE 1980). 
Figure 3 shows the locations of unconventional milling operations in the 
United States. As of January 1, 1980, 10 solution mines were operating, pri-
marily in southern Texas; four uranium recovery operations were located in 
Florida and Louisiana; and four heap-leaching operations were scattered 
throughout the western United States (DOE 1980). The yellowcake production 
capacity of unconventional operations ranges from 125 to 500 tons (113 to 
454 t) per year (in the range of small-capacity conventional mills). The 
number of workers (operators and maintenance personnel) dealing with uranium 
milling is generally less than 50 per operation. In 1979, there were approxi-
mately 2100 workers at conventional mills (DOE 1980) and about 600 workers at 
unconventional mills. These employment figures include only maintenance and 
production workers. Office and supervisory personnel are not included, as 
they generally do not have a potential for uranium exposure. 
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The four major phases in the conventional milling process are ore handling 
and preparation, extraction, concentration and purification, and precipitation. 
Figure 4 is a flow-diagram of the basic process. Ore handling and preparation 
is a physical step that comprises the blending, crushing, and grinding of the 
ore in preparation for the extraction phase. In the extraction phase, uranium 
is chemically leached from the ore by either an acid or an alkaline solution, 
depending on the lime content of the ore. Seventeen of the 21 conventional 
mills have ores with a low enough lime content to use an acid leach process. 
The other four mills, which handle ores with a lime content greater than about 
12%, use an alkaline leach process. 
In the next step, one of several chemical methods is used to concentrate 
and purify the feed solution from the extraction phase. The acid leach mills 
use one of three methods, depending on ore characteristics: solvent extrac-
tion is used by 10 mills, ion exchange by 3 mills, and Eluex by 4 mills. In 
the solvent extraction process, uranium in the feed solution is extracted into 
an organic phase using an organic solvent and is subsequently stripped into an 
aqueous phase using an al11Tlonium sulfate solution or other appropriate compound. 
The ion exchange process involves passing the feed solution through a resin 
column where uranium adsorbs on the resin and then is selectively removed by 
passing an elution or stripping solution through the column. The Eluex process 
is a combination of the ion exchange and solvent extraction processes. The 
feed solution from an alkaline leach extraction process generally requires no 
concentration and purification, as this process extracts uranium more selec-
tively than the acid leach process. One alkaline leach mill, however, uses an 
ion exchange type of process (resin-in-pulp) to concentrate and purify the 
feed solution. 
The final phase of the conventional milling process is the precipitation 
of uranium, usually in the form of ammonium diuranate (ADU), written chemi-
cally as (NH4)2U207. Acid leach mills precipitate the uranium product by the 
addition of lime and ammonia in a two-stage process, the addition of ammonia, 
or the addition of hydrogen peroxide, depending on the impurities in the feed 
solution. The principal method of precipitation in alkaline leach mills is the 
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addition of caustic soda (sodium hydroxide). The ADU product is then 
dewatered, filtered, washed, dried, and packaged. Mills that dry their 
product at relatively high temperatures (370° to 538°C) obtain a greenish-
black powder high in uranium oxide (U30S) content. Drying at lower tem-
peratures (100° to 150°C) results in a yellow-colored product high in ADU 
content. 
None of the three major unconventional milling processes has a dry-ore 
handling and preparation phase. The extraction phases of unconventional 
processes also differ from those of conventional milling processes. At a 
solution-mining operation, uranium is extracted from ore by injecting a 
leaching solution into an underground ore body and then pumping the uranium-
enriched solution to the surface. In uranium recovery operations, the phos-
phoric acid produced at commercial phosphoric acid plants is diverted, uranium 
is extracted from the acid solution, and the acid is returned to the phosphoric 
acid plant. The extraction phase in a heap-leaching operation involves per-
colating a leach solution through a low-grade ore pile or tailings pile and 
collecting the uranium-enriched solution as runoff. The uranium-enriched 
solutions of the unconventional processes then must pass through a concentra-
tion and purification phase and a precipitation phase similar to those of the 
conventional milling process. 
Radiological Exposures 
The greatest potential for occupational radiation exposure in uranium 
milling is the inhalation of airborne uranium compounds. Of primary concern 
is inhalation of ore dust in the crushing area and yellowcake dust in the 
drying and packaging area of conventional operations. The hazard is most 
acute during maintenance activities. Other steps in the milling process 
(extraction, concentration and purification, precipitation) present minimal 
inhalation hazard because the uranium is in a liquid solution during normal 
operations. Unconventional milling operations include no ore-crushing phase, 
and inhalation of yellowcake dust in the drying and packaging area is the 
- major concern. 
Workers of interest at uranium mills include operators and maintenance 
personnel. In 1979, there were 1165 operators and 951 maintenance personnel 
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at conventional mills (DOE 19S0). Operators in the crushing area and in the 
yellowcake drying and packaging area each account for approximately 10% to 20% 
of the mill operators. Some mills rotate their operators among different 
assignments semiannually or annually, with the result that all operators work 
at some time in the crushing and drying and packaging areas. Maintenance 
personnel, who work throughout the mill, have the potential for exposure to a 
variety of uranium compounds (ore dust, ADU, U30S). 
The hazard associated with the inhalation of ore dust is the presence of 
long-lived alpha emitters (23SU, 234U, 230Th , 226Ra , and 210 po ). Because these 
nuclides are mostly insoluble in lung fluids, they remain in the body for long 
periods. 
The relative hazard of yellowcake inhalation in the drying and packaging 
area is dependent on the temperature at which the ADU product is dried. The 
bright yellow compound, high in ADU, produced at mills that dry their product 
at a relatively low temperature (100 0 to 150°C) is highly soluble in lung 
fluids. Ammonium diuranate can accumulate in different parts of the body 
(e.g., bone), resulting in an internal radiation dose; however, of primary 
concern is its chemical toxicity to kidney tissue. The greenish-black uranium 
oxide compound (U30S) produced where drying is done at relatively high tempera-
tures (370° to 53S0C) is mostly insoluble in lung fluids. This form of ura-
nium concentrates in the lung, delivering an internal radiation dose. Kalkwarf 
(1979), Eidson and Mewhinney (1978 and 1980), and Cooke and Holt (1974) have 
attempted to determine the relative solubility of yellowcake compounds in 
simulated lung fluid. 
Annual external whole-body doses to mill workers are generally less than 
2 rem. For 1975, doses at NRC-licensed mills averaged 0.41 rem, with only 
three of the 437 monitored workers receiving a dose in excess of 2 rem (Cool 
1975). 
Conversion 
Conversion is a chemical process during which yellowcake is purified and 
converted to volatile uranium hexafluoride (UF6). Two commercial conversion 





other in Oklahoma. The total production capacity of these facilities is 
approximately 18,000 tons (16,300 t) of uranium per year. The two facilities 
employ a total of approximately 350 workers in uranium process areas. 
Process Descriptions 
The uranium industry currently uses two processes for the purification 
and conversion of yellowcake to UF6: fluorination-fractional distillation, 
and solvent extraction-fluorination. These processes are commonly referred to 
as the dry and wet processes, respectively. The major steps in each process 
are sampling, feed preparation, conversion, and purification. The primary 
difference between the two is that in the dry process, the conversion to UF6 
precedes purification, while in the wet process, conversion follows purifi-
cation. Figure 5 is a diagram of the two processes. 
The sampling phase of both processes consists of emptying the 55-gal 
(20B-~) drums of yellowcake received from the mills into a hopper, blending 
the contents, collecting a sample, and refilling the drums. The sample is 
analyzed for chemical and physical characteristics that may affect the process 
and to determine total uranium content. Sampling is done in an area separate 
from the remainder of the process area for dust control purposes. 
The feed preparation phase is initiated by empyting yellowcake from drums 
into the process. In the dry process, feed preparation requires several steps 
to produce a material with the proper chemical and physical characteristics. 
The initial step is calcination, which dries the yellowcake and converts many 
of the uranium compounds to uranium oxide (U308). This step is followed 
by crushing and blending to provide a uniform mixture before the feed is 
remoistened, formed into pellets, dried, and crushed into a homogeneous U30B 
powder. In the wet process, yellowcake is digested in large tanks of nitric 
acid for B hours. The resulting prepared feed is uranyl nitrate solution 
(U02(N03)2)· 
As shown in Figure 5, the next step in the dry process is conversion to 
UF6• The U308 powder is first processed with hydrogen gas (from cracked 
ammonia) through a fluidized-bed reductor for intermediate conversion to 
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(UF4) is accomplished in a series of fluidized-bed hydrofluorinators into 
which U02 and hydrogen fluoride (HF) gas are introduced. Final conversion 
takes place in a fluidized-bed fluorinator, where the UF4 powder and fluorine 
(F2) gas are combined to form gaseous UF6. The UF6 is purified in the dry 
process in a series of fractional distillation columns. Here, impurities 
including molybdenum and vanadium are boiled out while others (including uran-
ium daughters) are collected as ash at the base of the columns. The product 
is 99.99% UF6. 
Following the feed preparation phase, the next step in the wet process is 
purification, as shown in Figure 5. The uranyl nitrate solution from the feed 
preparation phase is purified by a solvent extraction process. The uranium-
loaded solvent is then scrubbed with acidified water to remove residual impu-
rities, and the uranyl nitrate is re-extracted into the aqueous phase. The 
solution is then concentrated in a two-phase evaporation system, producing 
uranyl nitrate which is denitrated to uranium trioxide (U03) powder in a 
stirred trough. Finally, the U03 powder is pulverized in a hammer mill. 
The conversion of U03 to UF6 is accomplished using a technique similar to 
the conversion phase of the dry process. 
Following the conversion to UF6 in both the dry and wet processes, the 
gaseous UF6 is condensed and drained into steel cylinders. When full, the 
cylinders are placed in steam chests where the UF6 is maintained as a liquid 
and homogenized by rotation of the cylinders. After the UF6 is sampled, the 
cylinders are cooled to solidify the UF6 into a white crystalline material. 
The cylinders are then weighed and placed in an outdoor storage yard to await 
shipment. 
Radiological Exposures 
As in uranium mills, the greatest potential for occupational radiation 
exposure in conversion facilities is the inhalation of airborne uranium com-
pounds. Inhalation is most likely to occur during the emptying and refilling 
of yellowcake drums in the sampling area, the removal of ash waste following 
the purification phase, and maintenance activities throughout the facilities. 
Inhalation of uranium daughters would be of concern during the removal of ash 
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waste. Maintenance personnel could be exposed to all the uranium compounds 
found in the facility, including yellowcake, uranium daughters, UF4, U02, U03, 
and uranyl fluoride (UOl2). Exposure to UF6 is not likely because UF6 reacts 
with moisture in the air and forms U02F2 and HF. 
An approximate breakdown of the conversion work force is 60% production 
and 40% maintenance. Less than 10% of the production force works in the samp-
ling plant, where there is a potential for inhaling yellowcake from the emp-
tying of drums. Because of the nature of maintenance activities, maintenance 
workers have the potential for exposure to a variety of uranium compounds. 
Uranyl fluoride, like ADU, is highly soluble in lung fluids and, if 
inhaled, would be distributed to other body organs, delivering an internal 
radiation dose. Chemical toxicity to kidney tissues would be the major con-
cern, however, as soluble uranium compounds are readily eliminated from the 
body. Uranium tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide, two intermediate compounds 
formed in the conversion process, are relatively insoluble in lung fluids and 
would concentrate in the lung, delivering an internal radiation dose. 
Annual external whole-body doses to conversion workers are well below the 
5-rem/yr limit. In 1975, doses at conversion facilities averaged 0.22 rem, 
with no doses exceeding 2 rem (Cool 1978). 
Enrichment 
Enrichment is a gaseous diffusion process that increases the 235u con-
centration of the UF6 feed material by selectively removing 238U. Uranium is 
enriched for both commercial and government use at three government-owned and 
contractor-operated gaseous diffusion enrichment facilities in Tennessee, 
Kentucky, and Ohio. In addition to enrichment operations, activities at the 
three sites have included the conversion of U03 to UF6, UF6 to UF4, and UF4 to 
metal, and decontamination and maintenance of diffusion equipment. 
All three plants receive natural UF6• The Kentucky plant also receives 
depleted UF6 from the other two plants and returns to them enriched UF6 in 
the range of 0.9% to 2.0% 235U• The end product of the Tennessee plant is 







UF6 for commercial use and >90% enriched UF~ for military and research uses. 
All three plants produce tailings of 0.2% 2 5U. 
Although each enrichment plant employs thousands of workers, under normal 
working conditions only about 19% of the work force has a potential for expo-
sure to urani urn. 
Process Description 
The enrichment facility receives UF6 in solid form in large steel 
cylinders (see Figure 6). After being weighed and sampled for uranium analy-
sis, the UF6 is heated and loaded into the enrichment cascade as a gas. The 
enrichment cascade is a series of many stages of diffusion equipment. Each 
stage consists of a converter containing the diffusion barrier and a compres-
sor that pressurizes the enriched stream from the previous stage, creating a 
pressure differential across the barrier in the next converter. This pressure 
differential enhances the diffusion of UF6 across the barrier. Although the 
UF6 is pressurized with respect to the barrier, it is still at much less 
than atmospheric pressure. The UF6 is enriched in 235U content because the 
235U diffuses through the cascade barrier more rapidly than 238U• Because 
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FIGURE 6. Flow Diagram of Enrichment Process 
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the difference in diffusion rates for 235U and 238U is very small, many dif-
fusion stages are required to achieve the desired enrichment. In total, the 
diffusion cascades cover many acres and are housed in large buildings. 
When the proper enrichment is reached, the UF6 is drained as a liquid 
into large steel cylinders. Each large cylinder is drained into smaller ship-
ping cylinders, which are weighed and sampled before shipment offsite. 
When maintenance is required, cascade operations continue while the equip-
ment requiring maintenance is valved off from the remainder of the system. 
The equipment is then evacuated and purged with air to remove UF6 before 
being disconnected. The openings are sealed with plastic and the equipment is 
removed for decontamination and repair. 
Radiological Exposures 
During normal operations, the cascade buildings are unoccupied except for 
control room operators. Because the cascade is a closed process, there are no 
routine concentrations of uranium in the building work areas. The cascade 
operators routinely collect samples of UF6 by attaching a sample bulb or other 
apparatus to a sampling manifold. At this time, operators may be exposed to 
UF6 through an inadvertent release. Operators may also be exposed during 
connection and disconnection of cylinders for UF6 load-in and load-out and 
during cylinder sampling. 
Despite the evacuation and purge in connection with maintenance activ-
ities, it is not uncommon for UF6 or U02F2 to be present when the equipment is 
opened. Maintenance workers are also near potentially contaminated surfaces 
during manual decontamination. In addition, cavities (such as valves) within 
equipment being dismantled may contain trapped UF6. 
Fuel Fabrication 
Fuel fabrication is a physical and chemical process that converts enriched 
UF6 to uranium dioxide (U02) powder and then mechanically forms the U02 into 
pellets, which are loaded into fuel assemblies. The current fuel fabrication 
industry in the United States consists of seven facilities that perform all or 
a portion of the fabrication processes necessary to produce finished fuel 







Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Missouri, and Washington State. 
Three facilities have the capability to accept enriched UF6 as feed and pro-
duce finished fuel assemblies, while two carry the process only as far as U0 2 
powder or pellet production. Two facilities complete the process by accepting 
U02 powder or pellets and producing finished assemblies. 
At the fuel fabrication facilities visited, production capacities range 
from 330 to 880 tons of uranium per year (299 to 798 t/yr). The industry has 
approximately 1400 production and maintenance workers. 
Process Description 
The three basic phases of fuel fabrication are the production of U02 
powder, the production of sintered pellets, and final fuel assembly. Figure 7 
is a diagram of the three phases. The following process description is for a 
typical fuel fabrication facility that converts UF6 to fuel assemblies. 
In the production of the U02 powder, the solid UF6 feed material is 
vaporized in an enclosed system for loading into the process. Next, the 
gaseous UF6 is piped to a hydrolyzation column where it reacts with water 
spray to form uranyl fluoride (U02F2) and hydrofluoric acid (HF). The 
uranyl fluoride is then reacted with ammonium hydroxide to form ammonium 
diuranate (ADU) precipitate and water. The ADU is dried and then calcined in 
a gas-fired rotary calciner under a hydrogen atmosphere to produce U02. The 
U02 is pulverized and transported by conveyor or in plastic containers to 
the pellet production area. 
To produce sintered pellets, a binder material is mixed with the U02 
powder. The mixture is fed into a slug press that produces nickel-sized U02 
slugs. These slugs are granulated and fed to an enclosed pellet press that 
produces green (unsintered) pellets. The pellets are then sintered in a 
hydrogen atmosphere to make them denser, ground (wet or dry) to the proper 
dimensions, and inspected. 
For fuel assembly, the inspected U02 pellets are taken to the pin-
loading area where they are mechanically fed into prepared fuel pins. Once 
filled, each pin is sealed with an end cap, wiped clean, checked for contamina-
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the pins are evacuated through a laser-produced hole in the end cap and filled 
with helium gas. The hole is welded shut and the pins are processed through a 
series of cleaning and testing (quality assurance) steps. Acceptable pins are 
assembled into fuel assemblies, which are inspected and placed in storage to 
await shipment • 
Radiological Exposures 
The major part of the fuel fabrication process (powder and pellet produc-
tion and the pin-loading step of the fuel assembly phase) is carried out in a 
large open area that is controlled because of the potential for airborne con-
tamination. The inhalation of UF6, U02F2, and ADU are possible in the 
production of U02. A significant portion of the fuel fabrication process 
consists of powder-handling operations involving insoluble uranium compounds 
(primarily U02). Therefore, inhalation exposures are a major concern. Areas 
of potentially high uranium air concentrations in the powder production phase 
are the conveyor system, U02 packaging and unpackaging areas, and inspection 
points. In the pellet production phase, the powder-sampling area and the 
pellet press are also areas of high potential air concentrations. The exten-
sive quality control inspections required for final fuel assemblies result in 
average annual whole-body external exposures on the order of 500 mrem, with 
maximum exposures as high as 2 rem. 
All production and maintenance personnel working in the controlled area 
are in an area of potentially high airborne uranium levels; therefore, inhala-
tion hazards are the major concern. For workers in the uncontrolled area, 
external radiation is the major concern. 
OTHER URANIUM FACILITIES 
In addition to the current commercial uranium industry, two other types 
of uranium facilities need to be considered: inactive facilities (Manhattan 
Project facilities and closed commercial facilities) and currently operating 
noncommercial facilities such as DOE facilities. A discussion of such facili-
• ties is presented in this section. 
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Inactive Facilities 
A review of inactive facilities is important because excessive occupa-
tional exposures to uranium are likely to have occurred in the early industry 
when many of these facilities were operating. Therefore, there may be occupa-
tionally exposed individuals of interest for health-related studies. 
Manhattan Project facilities were discussed in the introduction. Since 
most of these facilities have been closed for many years and since work during 
their operation was classified, reconstruction of working conditions and 
resulting occupational exposures would be very difficult. It is beyond the 
scope of this project to characterize the processes and radiological protec-
tion practices used at these plants during the Manhattan Project. 
Inactive commercial facilities include 23 milling sites (Goldsmith 1976) 
and approximately 12 fuel fabrication facilities. Since these facilities are 
closed, a site visit approach to gather information on processes and potential 
high-exposure areas is not possible. Any available data on worker exposures 
from these facilities could be reviewed in an effort to determine whether ade-
quate data is available for meaningful health-related studies. 
Noncommercial Facilities 
In addition to inactive facilities, there are approximately 20 operating 
noncommercial facilities that handle uranium. These include about 12 DOE 
facilities that are involved in work such as weapons testing, fabrication of 
nuclear material components, reprocessing of nuclear fuels, design and con-
struction of nuclear test reactors, nuclear waste technology, and production 
of uranium metal. Approximately eight private facilities are involved in 
fabrication of special nuclear fuel types, uranium scrap projects, and handling 
of depleted uranium compounds. 
An in-depth ~haracterization of these facilities, like that done for the 
commercial uranium industry, will not be performed. The Registry could, 
however, identify worker populations that would be good candidates for the 






REGULATION OF THE COMMERCIAL URANIUM INDUSTRY 
This section provides a discussion of regulation of the uranium industry. 
It includes a historical review of regulatory agencies and procedures for each 
phase of the industry, from mining through fuel fabrication. In addition, 
current regulatory agencies and procedures are reviewed. Only regulations 
relating to occupational radiation exposures are discussed. This regulatory 
review will indicate the types of exposure evaluation records that have been 
and are now being kept on uranium workers and the responsibility for maintain-
ing the records. This information will be valuable in the establishment of 
studies of worker health in this industry. 
MINING 
The measurement of radon daughters in underground mines began around 1950. 
The Occupational Health Field Station of the U.S. Public Health Service in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, has records of many radon-daughter measurements made in 
mines between 1950 and 1960. The records comprise such items as the mine name 
and location, the identity of personnel working underground at the time of the 
survey, the location of sampled areas, and the concentration of radon daughters 
in working levels (WL).(a) State agencies and mining companies began moni-
toring radon daughters in underground mines in about 1960. 
The first standard for radon daughters of 1 WL was recommended by the U.S. 
Public Health Service in 1959 and by the American Standards Association, Inc., 
and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1960.(b) Since the states were 
historically responsible for mine inspection, they adopted regulations similar 
to the recommended standard. The degree of enforcement in the five western 
(a) 
(b) 
A working level is equivalent to any combination of radon daughters in 
1 liter of air that will result in the emissi~n of 1.3 x 105 MeV of 
alpha energy in their complete decay throygh 14po. This potential 
alpha energy will occur when 100 pCi of 222Rn in 1 liter of air is in 
equilibrium with its daughter products. 
Historical reviews of regulation in the uranium underground mining indus-
try can be found in a report of the Federal Radiation Council (1967) and 
in the proceedings of an IAEA panel (McGinley 1975). 
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states that mined uranium varied; however, the standard was effective in 
reducing average industry-wide WL values from 7 WL in 1957 to 2.1 WL in 1966. 
In 1959, the Federal Radiation Council (FRC) was formed by an act of Con-
gress (Public Law 86-373) to provide "guidance for all Federal agencies in the 
formulation of radiation standards and in the establishment and execution of 
programs in co-operation with states. 1I In September 1967, FRC published the 
recommendation that no miner be exposed to more than 6 working level months 
(WLM)(a) in any period of 3 consecutive months or to no more than 12 WLM in 
any period of 12 consecutive months. In addition, individual exposure records 
were to be established and maintained. Prior to 1967, time-weighted evaluation 
of exposures had not been a generally adopted regulatory procedure. Instead, 
state regulations and the recommendations of the American Standards Associa-
tion, Inc., were based on a certain maximum concentration of radon daughters. 
This maximum had to be exceeded before worker access to the radiation area was 
restricted. A more conservative standard (0.3 WL or 4 WLM annually) was pro-
posed by the Labor Department just prior to the publication of FRCls 1967 
report. As a result of the debate that followed on reducing the exposure 
limit, FRC recommended and adopted an annual exposure standard of 4 WLM as of 
July 1, 1971. This standard remains in effect in the United States today. 
The Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) of the Department 
of the Interior was responsible for enforcing mining regulations from the 
early 1970s until 1978. Mine inspection data taken by MESA in 1977 (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 1977) showed an average of 0.51 WL in 
underground uranium mines, a level that compares favorably with an average of 
2.1 WL in 1966. Basic radiation protection standards with which mines must 
comply can be found in Title 30, Part 57 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(30 CFR 57), which is updated annually. 
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Public Law 93-173), 
effective March 9, 1978, provides the current health and safety standards for 
(a) A working level month is defined as the exposure to a concentration of 
one WL for a period of 170 h. The unit is used as a measure of cumula-







the mlnlng industry. As part of the Act, the Mine Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (MSHA) of the Department of Labor was formed, replacing MESA, to set 
health and safety standards and to regulate the mining industry. In addition 
to MSHA regulations, some states have their own mining regulations. Two other 
government agencies perform research in the mining industry: the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), formed in 1970 under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, is responsible for conducting health and 
safety studies and recommending standards for the mining industry; the Bureau 
of Mines, in the Department of the Interior, conducts health and safety 
research. 
MILLING 
Uranium mills were licensed and regulated by the AEC or by agreement 
states until 1974, when the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 transferred this 
responsibility to the NRC or agreement states. An agreement state refers to 
any state with which the regulatory agency has entered into an agreement under 
Section 274b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended) to conduct the 
licensing and regulation of facilities within that state. The first such 
agreement was initiated in 1962. Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, New Mexico, 
Texas, and Washington are agreement states that have milling operations today. 
Licensing requirements in agreement states must be no less stringent than those 
in NRC-licensed nonagreement states. Another regulatory agency that also has 
jurisdication over uranium mills is MSHA, which was given authority to enforce 
radiation and safety standards. 
The licensing of uranium mills is governed by the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (as amended). In nonagreement states, uranium mills that process or 
refine ores containing 0.05% or more of uranium by weight are required to have 
an NRC source material license. An application for such a license should be 
in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 40, IILicensing of Source Mate-
rial." General guidance on the format and coritent of the license applica-
tion is provided in NRC Regulatory Guide 3.5 (NRC 1977). In agreement states, 
a similar application must be presented to the appropriate state regulatory 
agency. 
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Part of the regulatory procedure includes semiannual inspections of 
licensed mills by NRC inspectors or by state inspectors in agreement states. 
These inspections, along with periodic renewal of a mill's source material 
license, are used by regulators to verify that mills are complying with the 
conditions specified in the license. 
Mills must comply with the radiation protection standards found in 
10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation." Initially written in 
January 1957 and updated annually, 10 CFR 20 has undergone over one hundred 
changes. In 1970, AEC started issuing safety guides (called regulatory guides 
today) to assist applicants and licensees in complying with the general 
requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations. Compliance with the regu-
latory guides themselves is not required; individual applicants or licensees 
may propose alternatives for new or existing programs that are not necessarily 
consistent with the guides. The justification for such alternatives is 
reviewed by the NRC staff and evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
Regulatory guides that are pertinent to evaluating occupational exposure 
in uranium mills are Regulatory Guides 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respira-
tory Protection (NRC 1976a), and 8.22, Bioassay at Uranium Mills (NRC 1978a). 
In addition, two draft regulatory guides prepared by NRC are in the process of 
public review. These are entitled Health Physics Surveys in Uranium Mills and 
Information Relevant to Ensuring That Occupational Radiation Exposures at 
Uranium Mills Will Be As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable. 
Bioassay(a) results (particularly urinalysis results) would be of 
interest in health-related studies (e.g., trying to relate urinalysis results 
to uranium intake). Historically, urinalysis requirements have varied. In 
1961, the AEC Division of Licensing and Regulation concluded that routine 
urinalysis was not necessary because it was an incomplete indicator of the 
presence of uranium (indicating exposure to soluble but not to insoluble forms) 
(AEC 1961). Although urinalysis continued to be conducted at a few mills after 
(a) Bioassay - the determination of the kind, quantity or concentration, and 
location of radioactive material in the human body by direct (in vivo) 





1961, it was not until the renewal of the Atlas Mill license in October 1975 
that NRC began to require bioassays at all uranium mills when licenses are 
issued or renewed (Alexander 1977). Urinalysis frequencies throughout the 
milling industry today are not standardized. During site visits, the follow-
• i ng programs were observed: 
• 
• biweekly urinalysis for crusher building personnel and yellowcake 
workers 
• biweekly urinalysis for all mill workers 
• monthly urinalysis for yellowcake workers 
• annual urinalysis for all mill workers. 
CONVERSION 
Historically, AEC and (since 1974) NRC have been responsible for licens-
ing and regulating commercial uranium conversion facilities. Like uranium 
mills, conversion facilities must have a source material license to operate. 
Requirements for the license are given in 10 CFR 40. Conversion facilities 
are also subject to inspections by NRC, must periodically renew their source 
material license, and must comply with the radiation protection standards in 
10 CFR 20. 
Regulatory guides that are pertinent to evaluating occupational exposure 
in conversion facilities include Regulatory Guide 8.11, Applications of Bio-
assay for Uranium (AEC 1974), and Regulatory Guide 8.15, Acceptable Programs 
for Respiratory Protection (NRC 1976a). Regulatory Guide 8.11 does not include 
recommendations for bioassay of the more highly transportable compounds UF6 
and U02F2, which are present in conversion facilities. 
ENRICHMENT 
Since the Manhattan Project was begun, enrichment facilities have been 
regulated by federal agencies. Prior to the Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974, AEC regulated the facilities. Since then, ERDA (1974 to 1977) and DOE 
(1977 to present) have regulated them. 
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Today, all enrichment facilities are owned by DOE and operated by a pri-
vate corporation under contract with DOE. As mentioned above, these facilities 
are also regulated by DOE. Such facilities are not formally licensed. All 
contracts to operate DOE facilities contain a health and safety clause which 
stipulates that the facility will be operated in accordance with DOE (formerly 
ERDA) Manual chapters and/or DOE Orders. Because a DOE field office may amend 
the Manual chapters and/or Orders to II fit II a particular facility, the types of 
personnel protection programs at different facilities may vary even though 
they are all operated for DOE. Facilities owned by DOE contractors are rou-
tinely audited and appraised by DOE. 
FUEL FABRICATION 
Historically, AEC and (since 1974) NRC have been responsible for licens-
ing and regulating commercial uranium fuel fabrication facilities. Fuel 
fabrication plants are licensed by NRC to process compounds that contain 
special nuclear materials.(a) Part 70 of 10 CFR specifies the information 
needed in license applications for the use of special nuclear materials. 
Regulatory Guide 3.39 (NRC 1976b), Standard Format and Content of License 
Applications for Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants, provides 
guidance on the preparation of an application for a special nuclear material 
license. 
Regulatory guides that are pertinent to evaluating occupational exposures 
in fuel fabrication facilities include numbers 8.11, Application of Bioassay 
for Uranium (AEC 1974); 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection 
(NRC 1976a); and 8.24, Health Physics Surveys During Enriched Uranium-235 
Processing and Fuel Fabrication (NRC 1978b). 
(a) Special nuclear material means 1) plutonium, uranium-233, uranium 
enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material 
that NRC, pursuant to the provisions of Section 51 of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, determines to be special nuclear material; or 2) any mate-









The current industry is regulated by numerous federal and state agencies. 
For example, MSHA and state agencies regulate uranium mines whereas NRC or 
agreement state agencies regulate uranium mills. This simultaneous regulation 
by many agencies has resulted in inconsistencies among radiation protection 
programs at similar types of facilities, because the same regulations may be 
interpreted and enforced in different ways by independent regulatory bodies. 
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RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH PRACTICES 
The purpose of this section is to describe general methods by which 
radiation hazards may be identified and controlled in uranium facilities. 
The four health physics practices discussed--facility monitoring, exposure 
control, exposure evaluation, and recordkeeping--have as their fundamental 
purpose the evaluation of exposure and the protection of the worker from 
unnecessary and potentially harmful exposure to radioactive materials. 
The greatest potential pathway for the exposure of uranium industry 
workers is the inhalation of airborne radioactive contaminants. In uranium 
facilities, the breathing air is monitored for suspended uranium nuclides. 
The selection of monitoring locations and the frequency of sampling or mea-
surements are determined by consideration of the quantities of radioactive 
materials in the production processes, their potential for escape from the 
system into the workplace, and their proximity to the worker. 
Exposure control is achieved by the following: design engineering to 
prevent releases, respiratory protection programs, the use of other protective 
clothing, and employee training programs. The primary design features include 
containment dependability, dust collection systems, and indoor area ventila-
tion and exhaust systems. The use of respirators is generally required during 
hazardous maintenance operations and where controls are insufficient to keep 
the concentration of uranium consistently below allowable limits. 
Exposure evaluations are necessary to estimate worker exposures to ura-
nium during normal operations and incidents. Methods include the determina-
tion of external gamma exposures, and bioassay (urinalysis and lung counting). 
External radiation exposure is measured using personnel dosimeters (thermo-
luminescence dosimeters (TLDs) or film badges). Throughout the uranium indus-
try, urinalysis is a common method of determining whether uranium has been 
taken into the body. However, urinalysis alone cannot be relied on as an 
indicator of uranium taken into the body. This is particularly true for 
workers whose urinalysis frequency is less often than biweekly, as an acci-





combinations of regular facility air monitoring, worker lung counting, fecal 
sampling, and nasal smears are used at many facilities in addition to 
urinalysis. 
In evaluating a worker's exposure to uranium, it must be noted that ura-
nium can present both a radiological and a chemical hazard to the body. The 
chemistry of a uranium compound determines its solubility in body tissues and, 
hence, it~ retention time in the body. All forms of uranium may accumulate 
through chronic exposures and remain in the body for long periods, resulting 
in a radiological hazard. Soluble forms also represent a chemical hazard and 
may damage kidney tissue. Insoluble uranium compounds of interest in the 
uranium industry include uranium oxide (U30S)' uranium dioxide (U02), and 
uranium tetrafluoride (UF4). Soluble compounds include ammonium diuranate 
(NH4)2U207' uranium hexafluoride (UF6), and uranyl fluoride (U02F2). The 
solubility of inhaled uranium compounds is only one of many factors that need 
to be considered to achieve even a crude estimate of dose from internally 
deposited uranium. A review of factors involved" in the dosimetry of uranium 
in the body is presented in Appendix C. 
Recordkeeping includes maintaining records of facility monitoring and 
exposure evaluation data. Regulatory agencies require each licensed uranium 
facility to maintain such records. 
Radiological health practices for each phase of the uranium industry are 
described in the following sections, based on information gathered during site 
visits and from reference materials. Conditions in the past would have varied 
considerably because of different regulatory requirements. 
MINING 
Radiological protection practices in uranium mines can reduce lung cancer 
• incidences and other illnesses that might result from the inhalation of ore 
dust and radon and its daughter products, and from exposure to penetrating 
external gamma radiations. Uranium can be mined safely if the radiological 
• hazards associated with the naturally occurring uranium decay series are under-
stood and appropriately controlled. Mine workers are protected by limiting 
their exposure to ore dusts containing the long-lived alpha emitters (23SU, 
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234U, 230Th , 226Ra , and 210po ), radon and its short-lived daughters (222Rn, 
218po , 214 pb , 2146i , and 214po ), and external gamma radiation. Exposure con-
trol is achieved by carefully monitoring the airborne radioactivity, design 
engineering to reduce the airborne concentrations, limiting worker access to 
areas that exceed radiation protection guidelines, and providing safety equip-
ment when necessary. 
Airborne radioactivity is regularly monitored in underground uranium mines 
using portable air sampling equipment. Quarterly air sampling for uranium ore 
dust is usually sufficient to demonstrate that the workers' annual exposure to 
long-lived alpha emitters is kept to less than operational limits. However, 
more frequent sampling may be necessary during unusually dusty working condi-
tions. Air samples are collected by air filter pumps and analyzed for gross 
alpha activity. The recommended gross alpha quarterly limit is currently 
35 pCi-hr/~ (air) (International Commission on Radiological Protection 1977). 
The primary inhalation hazard is attributable to the buildup of radon and 
radon daughters in underground mine atmospheres. General air sampling for 
radon and its daughters is performed with portable instruments such as the 
working-level meter, which detects the alpha and beta activity of the sampled 
air and automatically displays the working level. Radon can also be measured 
in collected air samples using alpha scintillation chambers (Lucas flasks), or 
can be determined directly by the two-filter method (the first filter collects 
the radon daughters, and the second filter collects 218po from the decay of 
radon in the tube separating the filters). Radon daughters can be measured 
using the modified Kusnetz method (IAEA 1976), which involves air sampling and 
filter counting followed by a second filter counting 40 to 90 min later. 
Other methods such as the Rolle and the Tsivoglou methods (IAEA 1976) can also 
be used. 
The annual average concentration of 222 Rn in equilibrium with its daugh-
ter products should not exceed 30 pCi/£, and occupational exposures to radon 
daughters should not exceed 4 WLM/yr. Title 30, Part 57 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (30 CFR 57) requires individual exposure records to be kept for 
all employees entering an area with a radon daughter concentration in excess 





External gamma radiation is monitored through the use of personnel dosim-
eter badges worn on the work clothing of the miners. If average gamma radia-
tion levels exceed 2 mR/hr in the working place, personnel dosimeters must be 
provided and records of cumulative individual exposure kept, as required by 
30 CFR 57. 
Forced-air ventilation of underground mines is the most effective method 
of reducing airborne radioactivity (especially radon) in the drifts and stopes. 
The exhaust air is discharged to the surface. Abandoned stopes can be sealed 
off (using rock and a plastic foam sealant) to reduce radon levels in active 
areas of the mine. Air cleaning is also used in some mines to filter and 
electrostatically precipitate radon and radon daughters from mine atmospheres, 
although this practice is not widespread because of high costs. 
Filter respirators (and sometimes even supplied-air respirators) are 
required in areas where air concentrations exceed certain operational levels. 
According to 30 CFR 57, respirators are required in areas exceeding 1 WL. 
Since the exposure limits are currently defined in terms of annual cumulative 
exposures, short-term exposures to high levels sometimes occur. These special 
situations underscore the need to closely monitor the workers' time-integrated 
exposure and maintain accurate exposure records to assure that overexposures 
do not take place. 
Employee training programs are given at mines to teach the fundamentals 
of occupational health and safety. Such programs must meet the standards of 
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. 
MILLING 
Radiological health aspects of uranium milling operations differ from 
those of mining in that radon and its daughters are not the principal radio-
• nuclides of concern. In mills, workers are exposed to uranium ore dust and 
yellowcake. There is a potential for external exposure to gamma radiation 
because large volumes of ore are handled, but the radiation levels are usually 
• quite low. Working conditions at uranium mills have improved during the past 
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decade. Radiation protection programs have also improved as more knowledge 
about the effects and metabolism of uranium and its daughters in the body has 
been gained. 
Radiation protection for workers in uranium mills is achieved by control-
ling the ambient levels of ore and yellowcake dust, and by establishing an 
adequate health physics program. This program includes regular air monitoring, 
surveys of work areas, respiratory protection, quality control, training and 
supervision of employees, an effective bioassay program, and recordkeeping. 
Plant design and engineering initially determine the magnitude of the 
radiological health problems that must be dealt with by safety management. 
Containment dependability, dust collection and prevention, and indoor area 
ventilation are the primary design features that prevent airborne radioactive 
materials from reaching unacceptable levels. Older facilities usually require 
upgrading to meet the current requirements for dust control. 
Facility monitoring is a method used to assess worker exposure. Ore pads, 
crusher buildings, and fine ore storage areas are usually monitored monthly or 
quarterly because ore dust is low in radioactivity. Air samples from these 
locations are analyzed by counting gross alpha activity using conventional 
alpha spectrometers. Operating conditions that are dustier than normal are 
sampled more frequently. The ore dust concentration of natural uranium in air 
is limited by 10 CFR 20 to 75 ~g/m3. The liquid phases of the milling pro-
cess are relatively dust free and are not monitored as frequently. Yellowcake 
dust is generated when the liquid concentrate is precipitated, dried, and 
packaged. Fixed-location (periodic and continuous) air sampling equipment and 
personal breathing zone samplers are used in this area of the mill, where the 
potential for an overexposure to uranium is greatest. Air filters are rou-
tinely collected (daily at end of shift) from continuous samplers. Weekly 
intakes of yellowcake dust are limited by 10 CFR 20 to 9.6 mg, which requires 
that concentrations of yellowcake dust in air be maintained below 200 ~g/m3 
of air. Respiratory equipment is usually required to prevent overexposures 
during the loading of barrels for product shipment. Radon daughter measure-
ments, gamma surveys, and surface contamination smears are normally required 




Employee training programs are given at mills to teach the fundamentals 
of health protection and radiological safety. The topics covered include 
personal hygiene, radiation measurement methods, safety regulations, and emer-
gency procedures. 
Bioassay at uranium mills helps to indicate the adequacy of the radio-
logical health program and the occurrence of overexposures to uranium. The 
frequency of urinalysis depends upon the ambient levels encountered; normally, 
a biweekly program is used. Bioassay results can provide guidance for correc-
tive action. Chest counting of workers is rarely performed at uranium mills 
because of the unavailability of counting facilities and the high background 
count rates. 
Records are kept, data evaluated, and audits performed at mills to 
identify trends and to maintain individual exposures within the limits in 
10 CFR 20. 
CONVERSION 
Facility monitoring at conversion facilities consists of routinely samp-
ling the breathing air in the working environment for airborne uranium and 
surveying work locations for surface contamination. Uranium can be found in 
the form of yellowcake, U02, UF4, or U02F2, depending on the location in the 
facility. Stationary samplers located throughout the general working areas 
collect airborne particulates on filter paper, which is removed at the end of 
each shift and counted for total activity. Portable air samplers and breath-
ing zone samplers are used during maintenance or other nonroutine activities 
to provide correlation checks with the stationary samplers. No provision is 
made for quantitative real-time indication of high particulate concentrations 
in air. The results of the air sampling program are maintained for future 
reference. Contamination smears are taken routinely throughout the plant. 
Visual inspections for contamination are also conducted every shift. 
As previously mentioned, the primary methods of exposure control are 
basic engineering design, respiratory protection programs, the use of protec-
tive clothing, and employee training programs. The engineering design 
features used at conversion facilities include the following: 
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• ventilated hood in the yellowcake sampling area 
• negative pressure system in the feed preparation phase to prevent 
the dispersion of uranium into the working environment 
• totally enclosed systems (i.e., fluidized bed reactors that convert 
U308 feed to UF6). 
Half-face masks with particulate filters provide routine respiratory protection 
for all workers. These respirators must be worn continuously in specified 
operating areas and during certain nonroutine activities. Full-face respi-
rators with particulate canisters or supplied air are also available for use 
during maintenance activities. Personal contamination surveys are performed 
by employees when leaving radiation areas. 
Exposure evaluation methods at conversion facilities include bioassay and 
determination of external gamma exposure. The routine bioassay program 
requires all workers in uranium process areas to submit urine samples once 
every 2 weeks. These samples are analyzed for uranium content (~g/2) using 
the fluorometric analytical technique. Included in the routine bioassay pro-
gram are lung counts once every 1 or 2 years. These are performed with onsite 
equipment or by a vendor-supplied mobile laboratory for whole-body counting. 
Records of personnel exposures and facility monitoring results are main-
tained according to the requirements of 10 CFR 20 (Paragraph 20.401). These 
requirements include recording individual doses quarterly on appropriate forms, 
keeping individual exposure records until NRC authorizes disposition, and 
keeping facility monitoring data for 2 years after the survey except for data 
used in determining individual exposures. 
ENRICHMENT 
Facility monitoring at enrichment plants varies depending upon location. 
Because the diffuslon cascade operates at a vacuum relative to atmospheric 
pressure, airborne uranium is normally not present. As a result, sampling for 
airborne particulates is not performed routinely. Instead, smoke detectors 
are used to alarm in the presence of any U02F2 formed following a release of 





point can be rapidly identified. Decontamination and disassembly areas are 
sampled routinely for airborne particulates. Uranium is present in these 
areas as a corrosion oxide film of U02F2 and UF4• These areas are also 
periodically surveyed for surface contamination. Maintenance shops are not 
routinely sampled for general airborne contamination, but are subject to local 
air sampling during special activities. 
Exposures at enrichment facilities are controlled through the use of 
engineering design, personnel dosimeters, respiratory protection, and employee 
training. An example of engineering design is the provision of vacuum hoses 
at connections to UF6 cylinders to draw away any leakage during connection or 
disconnection. Respiratory protection is required during specified routine 
and maintenance activities. Whenever a connection to a UF6 system is made or 
broken (including drawing a UF6 sample or attaching a UF6 cylinder to the 
cascade), a half-face mask is required. Respiratory protection is also 
required when cascade equipment is opened for maintenance, and during other 
maintenance activities such as grinding and cutting contaminated equipment. 
Evaluation of exposures is accomplished through a program of lung count-
ing, urinalysis, and external radiation monitoring. The frequency of urinaly-
sis varies depending upon the type of work and its location. Workers with a 
potential for multiple low-level exposures (e.g., during the connecting and 
diconnecting of UF6 cylinders) are scheduled monthly, while all other workers 
are scheduled quarterly. Lung counts are performed annually for workers 
exposed to less soluble forms of uranium, for example, workers in the deconta-
mination facility, compressor disassembly mechanics, and some field maintenance 
workers. All other workers are counted every 2 years. External exposures are 
monitored through the use of TLD or film badges. 
Lung count, urinalysis, and other monitoring and exposure data are kept 
for each employee. These records are maintained on a computerized data 
storage system for ease of retrieval • 
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FUEL FABRICATION 
Facility monitoring at fuel fabrication facilities includes sampling the 
air in work areas and surveying work locations for surface contamination. 
Breathing air in the working environment at fuel fabrication facilities is 
monitored for airborne particulate radioactivity by networks of fixed particu-
late samplers. These sampling networks are commonly a combination of breath-
ing zone and general area air samplers. For example, there are few fixed work 
locations in the powder production process, leading to a greater dependence on 
general area samplers, while the pellet production process is made up of 
several specific work stations that lend themselves to breathing zone sampling. 
Lapel and high-volume air samplers are also used, but on a nonroutine basis 
only. The particulate filters are collected at the end of each shift and 
counted for total activity. This method of sampling and analysis provides a 
post-exposure indication of air concentration. One fabrication facility uses 
an alpha air monitoring system to provide real-time indication of air concen-
tration in selected areas. This system is set up to alarm in the event of 
excessive levels of airborne contamination. External radiation levels are 
monitored by semiroutine gamma surveys at most facilities and continuously at 
some facilities with dosimeters (TLDs or film) located throughout the process 
areas. Contamination surveys are conducted routinely, both visually and by 
smear samples. 
The primary methods of exposure control are basic engineering design, 
respiratory protection programs, the use of protective clothing, and employee 
training programs. The engineering design features used at fuel fabrication 
facilities include ventilated hoods for the load-in and load-out procedures in 
the powder production phase, and bolted and gasketed enclosures for powder-
conveying equipment. Personnel internal exposures are controlled through the 
use of half- and full-face masks. Respiratory protection is required during 
the performance of tasks in areas with routinely high air concentrations. Most 
facilities have onsite mask-fitting and mask-testing equipment, and fit their 
personnel for more than one type of mask. At one facility, nasal smears are 






Exposure evaluation methods at fuel fabrication facilities include bio-
assay and the determination of external gamma exposures. All of the fabrica-
tion facilities maintain routine bioassay programs (urinalysis and lung 
counting) to evaluate personnel exposures. Sample collection and lung count 
schedules are determined on the basis of work location or, in some cases, the 
employee's time-integrated exposure. In the latter case, the urinalysis 
schedule may change from one period to the next if the air concentrations used 
for determining exposure increase or decrease for any reason. The frequency 
of urine sample collection ranges from weekly to quarterly while that of lung 
counts ranges from quarterly to annually. Some of the larger facilities have 
onsite lung-counting equipment. Most facilities contract the urinalysis to 
private laboratories. Following an acute exposure, fecal samples are col-
lected and urinalysis and lung count frequencies are increased. Personnel 
dosimeters (TLDs or film badges) are used to evaluate external total-bodY 
exposures. Dosimeters are evaluated either monthly or quarterly, depending on 
employee work location. 
Records of personnel exposures and facility monitoring data are main-
tained according to the requirements of 10 CFR 20 (Paragraph 20.401). 
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NONRADIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE URANIUM INDUSTRY 
In establishing any health-related study of the uranium industry, all 
possible exposures need to be considered. Radiological exposures have been 
outlined in previous sections of this report. In this section, nonradio10gica1 
exposures are reviewed with respect to the interpretation of the health effects 
of radiological exposures. An example is the impact of diesel fumes and ciga-
rette smoking on underground uranium workers, which has been under investiga-
tion (Archer and Wagoner 1973). In some instances, nonradio10gical exposures 
may be the dominant health hazard. In addition, it should be recognized that 
the industry is subject to the health exposures indigenous to all heavy indus-
try, such as noise, welding fumes, grinding dusts, and industrial cleaning 
solutions. 
MINING 
The primary nonradio10gica1 hazards in underground uranium mining include 
the inhalation of dusts, diesel engine emissions, noxious gases from blasting, 
and oil mists from compressed-air drills. Physical stresses such as heat, 
noise, and vibration can also be significant. The major concern, somewhat 
unique to the mining phase, is the inhalation of fine respirable dust, partic-
ularly silica dust. Most uranium ore is found in sandstone formations, which 
contain free silica. Chronic inhalation of silica dust in high enough concen-
trations can cause the lung disease silicosis. 
Concentration guides for mineral dusts, gases, and other nonradioactive 
airborne contaminants are published annually by the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH 1980). One category of concentration 
guides referred to as Threshold Limit Value-Time Weighted Average (TLV-TWA) is 
defined as the time-weighted average concentration for a normal 8-hr workday 
or 40-hr workweek, to which nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed, day 
after day, without adverse effect (ACGIH 1980). The ACGIHls TLV for respir-





TLV = 10 mg/m
3 
% respirable silica + 2 
The limit depends on the percentage of free respirable silica in the atmos-
phere and varies from 5 mg/m3 assuming no free respirable silica to a very 
restrictive value of 0.10 mg/m3 assuming 100% free respirable silica. The 
TLV for total dust (respirable and nonrespirable) in mg/m3 is determined 
from the following formula: 
_ 30 mg/m3 
TLV - % respirable silica + 3 
The limit depends on the amount of free silica in the atmosphere and varies 
from 10 mg/m3 to 0.30 mg/m3• 
Two major methods are used to keep airborne dust concentrations and other 
pollutants below the concentration guides: 1) wetting during blasting and 
ore handling and dumping, and 2) intake of fresh air to dilute and remove 
pollutants. 
Workers in open-pit mines have the potential for being exposed to similar 
nonradiological pollutants (siliceous ore dust and diesel engine exhaust emis-
sions). However, the concentrations of these pollutants are generally not as 
significant as in underground mining because of the diluting effects of the 
atmosphere. 
The incidence rates(a) for fatalities and disabling injuries(b) in the 
construction and operation of underground and open-pit uranium mines during 
1979 were similar to those of other types of mining, particularly coal (MSHA 
1980a and MSHA 1980b). 
(a) Incidence rate - number of fatalities or injuries per 200,000 employee-
hours, rounded to two decimal places. 
(b) Disabling injuries - nonfatal injuries that result in lost work days. 
47 
MILLING 
Nonradiological exposures in uranium mills are varied, and in fact are 
influenced by the milling process (conventional or unconventional). 
In the conventional process, the inhalation of ore dust is again a major 
concern in the ore crushing area, particularly if the ore has a high free 
silica content. In the extraction, concentration, purification, and precipi-
tation phases of milling, many chemicals are used including sulfuric acid, 
sulfates, carbonates, chlorides, nitrates, ammonia, lime, magnesia, and sodium 
hydroxide. Ammonia may present the greatest single potential for exposure. 
In the extraction phase, sulfur dioxide and sulfuric acid gases may be vented 
from leaching tanks. Although airborne concentrations of the gases are not 
known at this time, exposures are thought to be minimal since workers spend 
little time in the area. In addition, some mills have an exhaust system vent-
ing the tank gases to the outside. In the concentration and purification 
phase, solvent extraction tanks exhaust vapors from the kerosene-based liquid 
through roof vents, and worker exposures are low as long as the ventilation 
system is intact and functioning properly. 
The unique nonradiological hazards associated with uranium recovery 
operations (a type of unconventional milling) depend upon whether or not the 
uranium recovery plant is adjacent to the phosphate facility. When the ura-
nium recovery plant is located close to the phosphate facility, general emis-
sions from phosphate processing operations, which include fluorides and sulfur 
dioxide, may pose a greater hazard to uranium recovery workers than anything 
they are directly exposed to in their work environment. Depending on the pro-
cess used, workers also have a potential exposure to ammonia, hydrogen per-
oxide, kerosene, alcohol, hot sulfuric acid, phosphate anhydrites, and sodium 
fluorosilicate. From a practical standpoint, ammonia again seems to present 
the greatest single potential for exposure. 
In the solution mining process (another type of unconventional milling), 
unique potential hazards during the drilling of injection and recovery wells 
include exposure to noise and again the possibility of dust containing silica. 
The chemicals used to make up the injection solution, such as hydrochloric 





from a handling standpoint. Operations for installing and inserting the piping 
network that connects the systems also present minimal health hazards. 
Maintenance operations involved in the upkeep and installation of equip-
ment are common to all milling operations. These result in potential exposures 
to such contaminants as welding fumes, grinding dusts, particulates, and 
industrial cleaning solutions. However, the significance of such hazards is 
comparable to that experienced in other heavy industry operations. 
The incidence rates for fatalities and disabling injuries in the opera-
tion of uranium mills during 1979 were similar to those of other types of 
milling (MSHA 1980a and MSHA 1980b). 
CONVERSION 
Nonradiological health exposures are directly related to the steps 
involved in the conversion of yellowcake to volatile UF6. In the feed pre-
paration phase of the wet process, nitric acid is used for digestion of the 
ore, and potential exposures to N02-NOx gases are thus possible. One facility 
maintains the tanks under vacuum, but N02 occasionally escapes into the room. 
On the basis of extensive N02 monitoring, it appears that no chronic N02 
exposure problem exists. The TLV-TWA for N02 is 5 ppm. 
In the conversion phase, cracked ammonia is used to reduce the U308 and 
U03 to U02• The use of large quantities of anhydrous ammonia may represent 
the most significant potential for an exposure. At one facility, ammonia odor 
was noticeable in the solvent extraction area, but the concentration is report-
edly 5 to 10 ppm most of the time. The TLV-TWA for ammonia in air is 25 ppm 
(ACGIH 1980). The hydrofluorinators in the conversion phase present potential 
exposures to fluorides, hydrogen fluoride, hydrogen sulfide, and oxides of 
nitrogen. It is thought that any fluoride exposure problem would be environ-
mental and not occupational. Nonetheless, at one facility, monthly urinary 
fluoride analyses are performed for production and maintenance personnel. 
Exposures to off-gases are thought to occur mainly during accidental leaks • 
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Other chemicals to which workers in a conversion facility may be exposed 
include tributyl phosphate and hexane in the solvent extraction area of the 
purification phase, and fluorine gas generated by the electrolysis of potas-
sium fluoride with a hydrogen fluoride feed in the conversion phase. 
ENRICHMENT 
In the enrichment process area, low levels of fluorides exist at times. 
Any leakage of UF6 to the atmosphere results in the formation of uranyl 
fluoride (U02F2) and hydrogen fluoride (HF) gas. Maintenance personnel are 
most likely to receive exposures, during repair of improperly functioning cells 
containing trapped UF6• The likelihood of exposure is greatly reduced for 
these workers, however, because this hazard is well known and a rigid respir-
atory protection program is followed. An inadvertent leak would be more likely 
to produce a high but brief exposure to the surrounding workmen. Since the 
gas is visible in air, the source could be quickly identified and repaired. 
This rapid identification via observation decreases the occurrence of signifi-
cant exposures. 
Because UF6 is highly corrosive, much of the piping throughout the enrich-
ment system is nickel or stainless steel. This presents a concern during 
welding regarding potential exposures to nickel and chrome fumes, which are 
suspected carcinogens. Nickel exposures are also possible during the manu-
facturing of the diffusion barrier, which is a special porous medium used in 
the enrichment process. A metallic nickel powder is used in barrier produc-
tion. A recently completed study was designed to ascertain whether mortality 
from respiratory cancer among barrier workers exposed to airborne metallic 
nickel differed from that among plant employees with no occupational exposures 
(Godbold and Tompkins 1979). The results of the study do not support the con-
tention that there is a substantial risk of respiratory malignancies to workers 
exposed to this nickel material. Other contaminants in the enrichment process 
include asbestos, sulfuric acid, and fluorides. 
Air monitoring and urinalysis programs are conducted for the detection of 
contaminants at enrichment facilities. 
vary depending upon exposures. Action 
been established at one facility. 
Sampling frequencies for urinalysis 







The most prevalent nonradiological exposure throughout fuel fabrication 
facilities is to ammonia used in the powder production phase. In one facility 
visited, a strong odor of ammonia gas was noticeable in the autoclave area, but 
the gas was reportedly coming from the ammonia recovery plant. There, a waste-
receiving tank is vented to the atmosphere in a manner that occasionally causes 
ammonia to return to the plant. Concentrations as high as 15 ppm are not 
unCOlTlllOn, and a scrubber to prevent gas rec i rcu 1 at ion is to be added to the 
system. The TLV-TWA for ammonia in air is 25 ppm (ACGIH 19S0). In another 
facility, an ammonium hydroxide tank in the ADU area had a plugged line, and 
the solution had backed up and spilled onto the floor. This was considered to 
produce an airborne ammonia level of 75 to 100 ppm (the "normaP level is 
reportedly 5 to 10 ppm). The floor looked as if many spills or leaks have 
occurred. In order to determine ammonia levels in this area, breathing zone 
and area samples are taken periodically. 
After the ADU and U30S are calcined in the powder production phase, 
additional potential for fluoride exposure exists. In all facilities visited, 
occupational exposures to fluorides are extremely low, and the concern with 
respect to fluorides is environmental (from stack emissions). This conclusion 
was based on past monitoring activities. 
In the fuel assembly phase, completed fuel assemblies are cleaned with 
acetone, which is obtained from a dispenser and manually wiped onto the 
assemblies. Although no quantitative data were available, exposure to acetone 
may present a problem. 
Nitric acid is used to dissolve uranium in waste recovery operations. 
Nitric acid is also used for cleaning purposes at the ammoniator. These 
operations involve potential exposures to peak concentrations of N02-NOx' 
especially during the opening of digester doors. Sampling has been done for 
oxides of nitrogen at the facilities. Perchloroethylene and tributyl phos-
phate are used in conjunction with nitric acid for waste cleanup in at least 
one facility. Exposures to these vapors reportedly are not excessive. 
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Another area of potential airborne ammonia is in the radioactive waste 
area where ammonium hydroxide is used. Normal gas levels here are 30 to 
50 ppm, and the odor of ammonia was easily noticeable during our visit. For 
this and all areas where spills or leaks may occur, cleanup is usually accom-
plished by a simple mopping procedure. This suggests.that maintenance person-
nel may be exposed to the highest ammonia concentrations found in fuel 
fabrication. 
Other chemicals of interest used in fabrication include trichloroethylene, 
trichloroethane, hydrofluoric acid, sodium hydroxide, and hydrochloric acid. 
A variety of the potential hazards common to the rest of the uranium industry 






u.s. URANIUM REGISTRY TISSUE PROGRAM 
The preceeding sections of this report have briefly characterized the 
facilities, processes, radiological aspects, and industrial hygiene aspects of 
the uranium industry. It has been shown that the potential exists for occupa-
tional exposure to many different chemical forms of uranium. The deposition, 
metabolism, and retention of these compounds in man are not completely under-
stood. Information about these processes can be obtained from post-mortem 
study of uranium workers with a previous history of uranium exposure. 
One of the Registry's most important accomplishments has been to estab-
lish a post-mortem tissue study program, which represents the first systematic 
effort to contact and gain the assistance of workers exposed to uranium. The 
program objectives, the procedures for enrolling workers in the program, the 
types of tissue to be studied, and the analytic procedures to be used are dis-
cussed in this section. 
The tissue program of the USUR is patterned after that of the U.S. Trans-
uranium Registry (USTR), which has been operated since 1968 by HEHF with sup-
port from PNL. The USTR has been sponsored successively by AEC, ERDA, and DOE. 
During the 12 years of its operation, the USTR has enrolled in the program a 
total of over 1000 persons from six government-contractor-operated and six 
private facilities, and 845 valid autopsy permits are currently on file for 
future donation of tissues. The Registry has finished processing tissues and 
data from 76 autopsies, with 29 remaining to be completed, and is in the late 
stages of analyzing a donated whole body. In addition, scientists of the 
United Kingdom have provided to the Registry data obtained from 35 autopsies 
of transuranic workers. The work of the USTR has been described in several 
reports and publications,(a) and the experience gained during its operation 
has been used in developing the tissue program of the USUR. 
In contrast to the substantial past interest in tissue concentrations of 
transuranic elements, interest in analyses of human tissue for uranium has 
(a) Norwood 1969; Norcross and Newton 1972; Norwood 1970; Norwood and Newton 
1975; Norwood et al. 1972; Breitenstein 1979. 
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been limited, and such studies have been carried out only sporadically, either 
as an incidental feature in a transuranic tissue study (ERDA 1975) or in iso-
lated cases.(a) The need for dedicated studies of tissue distribution similar 
to those of the USTR and for epidemiologic studies of uranium exposure was 
identified by Boback, Darr, Finkel, Heid, Ross, and Sterner during the ERDA-
sponsored Conference on Occupational Health Experience in 1975 (ERDA 1975). 
The tissue program of the USUR represents the first systematic effort to 
enroll workers exposed to uranium in a program of post-mortem tissue study. 
The objectives of the USUR tissue program are to: 
1. determine the distribution and levels of uranium in the tissues of 
occupationally exposed workers 
2. compare bioassay measurements of exposed individuals with the 
results of analyses of tissues obtained at autopsy 
3. seek evidence of histopathologic changes related to any uranium 
deposition that may be present 
4. conduct analyses of whole bodies, when available, to obtain more 
precise data on the uranium burdens, if any, in the body and organs 
and especially the distribution in parts of the body, such as most 
of the skeleton, that are not usually accessible for sampling. 
Workers in uranium-handling facilities are enrolled in the program through 
the cooperative efforts of USUR staff and the medical, industrial relations, or 
health physics personnel of the facilities. The majority of volunteers are 
likely to be enrolled by medical personnel at the time of their physical exami-
nation or by health physics personnel at the time of a bioassay or lung count-
ing procedure. During enrollment, a simple occupational history is obtained, 
and permission is gained for access to the worker's medical history and expo-
sure data. The agreement signed by the individual runs for a period of 
5 years; the USUR usually seeks to renew the agreement upon its expiration. 
While this agreement provides permission for an autopsy, experience has shown 
(a) Quigley, Heatherton and Ziegler 1959; Heatherton, Boback and Quigley 1963; 







that another autopsy permit may be required at the time of death to satisfy 
hospital and state authorities. For this reason, it is important that the 
next of kin be aware of the program at an early date and be agreeable to the 
volunteer's participation in the Registry's tissue program. An alternative to 
pre-enrollment is to obtain after death the consent of next of kin to the 
analysis of tissues removed during an autopsy. Follow-up after initial con-
tacts is carried out by on-site plant personnel, but subsequent follow-up is 
the responsibility of the Registry. The next of kin receives a $500 stipend 
when the autopsy is completed, as a gesture of appreciation for the regis-
trant's willingness to participate in this important scientific program and 
his cooperation in keeping the USUR informed of his place of residence. 
The Registry maintains a system by means of which calls may be received 
at any time of day or night at (509) 376-7987. This system permits a rapid 
response in the event of the death of a registrant so that the pathologist 
conducting the autopsy may be aware of the requirements of the Registry for 
specific organs and tissues for analysis. Instructions are also provided for 
the processing and transport of the tissues to Richland, Washington, for 
radiochemical analysis. 
The Registry recommends the use of standard procedures in the performance 
of the autopsy. On the advice of experts, we request the following tissues: 
1. Lung - right and left (whole) 
2. Lymph nodes (hilar) 
3. Liver (whole or minimum 400 g) 
4. Bone: 
Ribs - one or more whole ribs, excluding 1, 2, 11, and 12 
Sternum (whole) 
Vertebrae - vertebral wedge 
Patella 
5. Spleen (whole) 
6. Thyroid (whole) 
7. Kidneys - right and left (whole) 
8. Ovaries or testes (both) 
9. Tumor, if any 
10. Blood from heart (10 ml) 
11. Muscle - iliopsoas 
12. Fat from abdomen (panniculus) 
13. Skin from both sides of abdominal inclslon, and subcutaneous fat 
14. Calvarium and brain, only if brain is removed as part of regular 
autopsy. 
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The organs of particular interest are the skeleton, lungs, tracheobronchial 
lymph nodes, and kidneys. In past studies, these organs have been demon-
the strated either to have the hi~hest concentrations of uranium or to show 
greatest effect from uranium. ta ) The above list is subject to revision in 
the light of future developments. 
Upon completion of the autopsy report by the pathologist who conducted the 
autopsy, a copy of the report will be obtained by the USUR. A set of histo-
logic slides will be obtained for examination by pathologist consultants to the 
Registry. In addition to the death certificate, any available medical records, 
health physics data, and other occupational exposure data will be procured. 
Analysis of the uranium concentrations in the tissues will be carried out 
by PNL using neutron activation analysis. This procedure involves neutron 
activation of a dried tissue sample by exposure to a flux of approximately 
1014 nls for 30 min. Following a decay period of 24 hr, gamma spectroscopy 
is performed. The 239 NP activity detected can be correlated to the original 
amount of 238u in the sample. After the activated sample has decayed for 
about 3 weeks, the 235U level can be determined through gamma spectroscopy, 
by relating the 140Ba_La activity to the original 235U levels. The 235U 
analysis will be performed only on samples for which the isotopic mixture of 
the individual's exposure is unknown. 
Individuals who were exposed to uranium prior to the existence of modern 
exposure standards are presently being enrolled by the USUR. The reliability 
of concentration and distribution data and the demonstration of effects is more 
likely in such individuals than in those who have received less exposure. How-
ever, ample attention will be given to those who were less exposed and even to 
exposed workers with no record of intake of uranium. The lesser exposures are 
of immediate interest because of the rarity of heavy exposures under current 
standards. The sampling of potentially exposed individuals with negative 
in-vivo measurements results may serve to check the adequacy of in-vivo mea-
surements in the detection of deposition. 
(a) ERDA 1975; Quigley, Heatherton and Ziegler 1959; Heatherton, Boback and 
Quigley 1963; Roberts, Coulston and Bates 1977; Berdnikova 1970; Hodge, 





The USUR tissue program will develop data that will assist in evaluating 
the accuracy of current in-vivo measurement techniques. The data will also 
be useful in assessing models of distribution and excretion of uranium in man 
and the assumptions underlying those models. In developing these data, the 
Registry will contribute to the evaluation of the propriety of existing 
standards and the adequacy of current health protection programs • 
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FACILITIES VISITED BY URANIUM REGISTRY PERSONNEL 
• 
APPENDIX A 
FACILITIES VISITED BY URANIUM REGISTRY PERSONNEL 
Comean~ F ac il it~ T~ee Location 
l. Kerr-McGee Mine (underground) Grants, NM 
2. Western Nuclear Mine (open-pit) Well pi nit, WA 
3. Dawn Mining Company Mill Ford, WA 
4. Exxon Mill Douglas, WY 
5. Federal-American Partners Mi 11 Gas Hills, WY . 
6. Union Carbi de Mi 11 Gas Hills, WY 
7. Union Carbide Mi 11 Uravan, CO 
8. Western Nuclear Mill Well pi nit, WA 
9. Kerr-McGee Mill Grants, NM 
10. Rio Algom Mi 11 Moab, UT 
11. UNC-Homestake Partners Mill Grants, NM 
12. New Wales Chemical/ Uranium Recovery Lakeland, FL 
IMC Corp. 
13. Wyoming Minerals Corp./ Uranium Recovery Pierce, FL 
Farmland Industry 
14. UNC Recovery Corp./ Uranium Recovery Mulberry, FL 
W.R. Grace & Company 
15. Gardinier Uranium Recovery Tampa, FL 
16. Wyoming Minerals Solution Mine Ray Point, TX 
Corp. - Lamprecht ., 
17. Wyoming Minerals Solution Mine Bruni, TX 
Corp. - Bruni 
.. 18. United States Steel Solution Mine George West, TX 
A.I 
Company 
19. United States Steel -
Niagara Mohawk 
20. Wyoming Minerals Corp. -
Kennecott Copper 
21. Kerr-McGee 
22. Allied Chemical 
23. Department of Energy 
24. Department of Energy 
25. Babcock & Wilcox 
26. Babcock & Wilcox 
27. General Electric 
28. Westinghouse 
29. Exxon 
30. Combustion Engineering 
31. United Nuclear Corp. 
32. General Electric 
33. Atomic International 
34. National Lead 
35. Rockwell Hanford Co. 
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RADIOLOGICAL PROPERTIES OF URANIUM 
• 
APPENDIX B 
RADIOLOGICAL PROPERTIES OF URANIUM 
The typical worldwide concentration of natural uranium in soil ranges 
from 1 to 4 ppm with an average of 2 ppm (0.0002% uranium) (National Council 
on Radiation Protection and Measurement 1976). Ores recovered by conventional 
mining methods (open-pit and underground) contain an average of 1300 ppm ura-
nium (0.13% uranium). Unconventional mining methods (solution mining, uranium 
recovery, and heap leaching) are generally used to extract ores containing 50 
to 200 ppm uranium (0.005 to 0.02% uranium). 
ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION 
In nature, uranium exists as a composite of three primary isotopes: 
238U, 235u, and 234u. The relative abundance of the isotopes is 99.274% 
238u, 0.720% 235u, and 0.005% 234U (ERDA 1975). Uranium exists in these 
isotopic proportions throughout the mining, milling, and conversion phases of 
the uranium fuel cycle. 
Uranium is enriched to between 2 and 4 wt% 235U at enrichment plants for 
use in commercial fuel fabrication. A by-product of the enrichment process is 
depleted uranium, which is low in 235U content. Typical weight percents of 
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Three decay series occur naturally in the earth's crust: the thorium 
series (parent 232Th ), the uranium series (parent - 238U), and the actinium 
series (parent - 235U). The uranium series is of primary importance in the 
B.1 
commercial fuel industry. The decay scheme of the uranium series is shown 
in Figure B.1. Daughters of 238U in unprocessed uranium are in secular equi-
librium(a) unless a condition or process removes one or more of the decay 
products from the chain. One such condition occurs when gaseous 222Rn , the 
daughter of 226Ra , disperses into the atmosphere. The emanation of radon gas 
from uranium ore is of concern during mining. Radon decays to several short-
lived daughters, 218po , 214 pb , 214Bi , and 214 po , which can either attach to 
dust particles or remain unattached in the atomosphere. Because of their short 
half-lives, radon daughters will release most of their energy in the lung when 
inhaled. 
Most 238U daughter products are chemically removed during the milling 
process, resulting in an end product of between 80% and 95% uranium. Two 
daughters, 234Th and 234 pa , will build back to approximately 70% secular 
equilibrium in 30 days. 
(a) Secular equilibrium - a state of radioactive equilibrium in which the 
half-life of the parent is much longer than that of the daughter, 
resulting in equal activities (Ci) of parent and daughter. 
B.2 
FIGURE B.1. Uranium-238 Decay Series 
• 
B.3 
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THE DOSIMETRY OF URANIUM IN THE BODY 
In the present context, radiation dosimetry is defined as the assessment 
of the amount of energy imparted to body tissues by the radioactive decay of 
unstable isotopes. The dosimetry of uranium and its decay series daughter pro-
ducts involves the measurement or estimation of energy deposited by gamma rays, 
x rays, beta particles, and alpha particles that are emitted as the isotope 
undergoes nuclear transformations. Since the biological effects of these 
radiations are directly related to the amount of energy deposited per gram of 
tissue, the quantification of dose is important in radiation protection. The 
absorbed dose is expressed in units of rads (1 rad = 100 ergs/gram) or Grays 
(1 Gy = 1 joule/kg = 100 rad). 
Radiation doses from sources outside the body are measured with radiation 
detection devices. Estimates of whole-body doses received by uranium workers 
from external sources of penetrating gamma radiation can be determined from 
personnel dosimeters worn on the body, or from gamma surveys of work areas and 
a record of the time spent by workers in those areas. 
If radioactive source materials are emitting alpha and beta particles 
inside the body, the resulting radiation dose to organs and tissues can only 
be estimated from in-vivo determinations. Direct measurement of alpha and 
beta emitters is complicated because the range of these particles in tissue is 
short (microns to millimeters). The energy of these particles is therefore 
absorbed in the tissues. Photons from 235U and 234Th inside the body can be 
detected by whole-body counting. 
Internal dosimetry involves two major tasks: 1) determining the amount 
and distribution of radioactive material located in a given region of the body, 
and 2) determining the amount of energy delivered to surrounding tissues by 
that deposition during a specific period of time • 
Radionuclides can enter the body by inhalation, ingestion, or puncture 
wounds through the skin. The mode of intake determines which organs or systems 
will be affected most and, ultimately, the pattern of deposition and clearance 
C.1 
of the materials from the body. For uranium workers, the primary concern is 
inhalation. The remainder of this discussion therefore relates to the assess-
ment of dose due to the inhalation of uranium compounds. 
Breathing rates, respiratory tract geometry, particle size distribution, 
and aerosol properties combine to determine the fate of airborne radioactive 
material that may be deposited in the respiratory system. The chemical solu-
bility and size of the inhaled particles determine whether the material will 
be cleared by the mucous stream and swallowed, or dissolved by lung fluids and 
transferred to the lymphatic or blood circulatory systems. The Task Group on 
Lung Dynamics of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) 
developed a compartmental model of the body for determining the fate of inhaled 
chemical compounds (ICRP 1966). The group calculated rate constants for the 
transfer of inhaled particles between the respiratory system, lymph glands, 
blood, and gastrointestinal tract. Their lung model was revised and modified 
in ICRP Publication 19 and ICRP Publication 30 (1972 and 1979). Compounds 
were separated into three broad categories according to their retention in the 
lung: class Y for substances cleared slowly, class W for those cleared at 
moderate rates, and class D for those cleared rapidly. Removal half-times 
assigned to each class were ~100 days, 10 to 100, and ~10 days, respectively. 
Some experimental data show, however, that simplified models do not adequately 
predict deposition, retention, clearance, and excretion for many radioactive 
compounds. The uranium compounds and decay products of radium are among the 
most difficult aerosols to categorize for purposes of internal dosimetry. As 
mentioned previously in this report, the temperature of calcination and the 
chemical form of uranium compounds may strongly influence their solubility 
(and therefore their body metabolism). Another difficulty encountered in the 
use of models involves host-specific differences that should be (but usually 
are not) taken into account, for example, differences in clearance rates due 
to the health, age, and sex of the host, and other factors such as smoking 
habits. 
After the quantity of radioactive material in a given region of the body 
has been established, the radiation energy delivered to surrounding biological 







the type of radiation and its initial energy, the decay constant, the effec-
tive biological half-life, the formation of radioactive daughter products, the 
spatial distribution of particulate sources in the region, and the physical 
characteristics of the energy-absorbing medium. The mass of the irradiated 
tissues and their density must be specified, as well as the time period over 
which the integral dose is to be calculated. The isotopic ratio of 238U, 
234U, and 235U is important in the dosimetry of enriched uranium. 
For gamma-emitting sources in the body, the dose to an organ or tissue 
includes not only the contribution from sources within the organ itself, but 
also the dose from sources deposited within surrounding organs. Publications 
26 and 30 of ICRP (1977 and 1979) provide mathematical methods for calculating 
cross-organ doses. 
An example of a formula for calculating average organ doses from inter-
nally deposited radionuclides is: 




where 51.2 is a constant conversion factor, E is the average energy of the 
particle (MeV), f is the absorbed fraction of the radiation in the site, g is 
the fractional yield of the emission, A is the initial burden of radioactivity 
(~Ci) in an organ of mass W (grams), and B(t) is the retention of the material 
as a function of time (days). The result is an average organ dose value. 
However, the organ is rarely irradiated uniformly. Much of the tissue receives 
no radiation dose at all, while the irradiated portions may receive doses much 
higher than the average value for the whole organ given by the formula. 
For the nonpenetrating alpha- and beta-emitting radionuclides, the par-
ticle energy, stopping power of the tissue, and detail of track structure 
become important in the specification of radiation dose. On a microscopic 
scale, wide fluctuations are found in the specific energies actually imparted 
to critical biological targets (such as radiosensitive cells or nuclei within 
cells) from densely ionizing charged particles. Simple dose averaging fails 
to account for these wide variations in dose, which are ultimately responsible 
C.3 
for whatever radiation effect is observed macroscopically. Methods have 
recently been developed for calculating the microdosimetry of inhaled alpha and 
beta emitters (Fisher 1980). These methods permit a more exact description of 
the internal dose distribution. 
CONCLUSIONS 
External and internal dosimetry are important aspects in the radiation 
protection of workers in the nuclear industry. Internal dosimetry, however, 
is complex. Many factors must be taken into account to achieve even a crude 
estimate of the dose from internally deposited radioactive materials. No 
simple guidelines or methods are available for calculating internal doses with 
precision, particularly in the case of alpha and beta emitters. Conventional 
dose averaging fails to provide a satisfactory indicator of the specific doses 
to sites in tissues that result in observable biological effects. 
Although considerable progress has been made in radiation dosimetry, much 
additional work remains to be accomplished (Spitz et ale 1980). This work 
should include improved characterization of the retention, distribution, and 
clearance of uranium compounds (particularly yellowcake) in man, and further 
studies of the microscopic patterns of energy distribution in small but bio-
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